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I
INTRODUCTION
As is true of any other practice that involves the application of rules by
1
human beings, sentencing practices are suffused with the exercise of discretion.
In light of a range of permanent conditions that shape the setting in which
sentencing decisions are being made—including, the indeterminacy of legal
rules, differences of opinion regarding the aims of punishment, and uncertainty
regarding the particular offender’s prospects of reoffending—it is clear that
sentencing laws cannot totally control the way in which judges, prosecutors, and
juries exercise their discretionary powers. Nevertheless, there is considerable
support for the view that some forms of legal regulation of sentencing practices
may be effective in reducing unwarranted disparities and in reinforcing the
legitimacy of the criminal justice system. Different legal systems employ
different mechanisms, including mandatory penalties, system-wide sentencing
guidelines, and different forms of judicial review of sentencing decisions, in an
attempt to achieve these goals.
This article seeks to contribute to our understanding of the political and
institutional factors shaping cross-national differences in the regulation of
sentencing discretion. In particular, the article focuses on an important pattern
that clearly emerges when we adopt a comparative perspective to examine
current trends in sentencing law, namely, the exceptionally extensive use of
determinate sentencing laws in the American legal system in comparison with
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1. “Sentencing discretion” exists when a decision-maker can choose between two or more legallyvalid options in a way that affects the penal sanction that may be inflicted on an offender upon his
conviction. Sentencing discretion, to clarify, is exercised not only by judges but also by other actors
whose decisions have an impact on the sentencing outcome, including prosecutors.
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other central common law and civil law systems. Over the last three decades,
determinate sentencing reforms have proliferated in American law. The scope
2
and range of mandatory penalties increased dramatically. Numerical
sentencing guidelines were adopted in most of the states and in the federal
3
system. Many jurisdictions abolished their parole system or imposed statutory
4
restrictions on the discretion of parole authorities. Despite the growing
Americanization of political debates over crime problems in various Western
democracies, these models of determinate sentencing legislation did not find a
market across the Atlantic. The number of offenses liable to mandatory
sentences in other Western democracies has remained significantly lower than
in the United States. European systems did not adopt “truth in sentencing” laws
or similar statutory mechanisms to restrict the early release of prisoners. And
no other country has imported the American version of numerical sentencing
guidelines.
This article considers why the idea of determinate sentencing reform has
gained such prominence in post-1970s American law but has not had a similar
influence in other Western legal systems. This inquiry has important
implications regarding two central topics in comparative law and criminal
justice. First, the claim that the standard mechanisms serving to regulate
sentencing discretion in the American legal system today are considerably more
formalized, rigid, and restrictive than those operating in civil law systems (as
well as in other common law jurisdictions) seems to be at odds with the
conventional way in which the essentials of American and European
conceptions of adjudication are characterized in comparative law scholarship.
American conceptions of adjudication are usually associated with a pragmatist
5
approach to judicial lawmaking, a willingness to recognize the policymaking
6
function of courts, and a “jurisprudential style” that gives much greater weight
7
to substantive values of justice than other legal systems are willing to provide.
The European legal tradition, by contrast, has long been famous for its striving
to minimize the scope of judicial discretion and for its tendency to rely on
codified legal norms for furthering that goal. In this context, both the
proliferation of determinate sentencing mechanisms in American law and the
resistance of European policymakers to adopt these mechanisms raise
important questions for comparative legal scholarship.
The second context of comparative scholarship in which it is important to
analyze the differences between American and European sentencing policies

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

See discussion infra Part II.A.
See discussion infra Part II.B.
See discussion infra Part II.C.
Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331 (1988).
MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN
STATE (1998).
7. P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS (1987).
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pertains to the debate about the impact of the United States on the policies of
other national legal systems in the current era of globalization. The United
States has been a prominent exporter of ideas in the criminal justice field since
the nineteenth century. The attractiveness of America’s penal innovations in
the eyes of continental observers found a famous expression in Alexis De
Tocqueville’s classic study The American Penitentiary and its Application in
8
France. The English borrowing of the pioneering models of parole and
probation originally developed in Massachusetts in the late nineteenth century
provides another early example of the migration of American models of
9
criminal justice across the Atlantic. However, in light of the hegemonic role of
the United States in shaping the contours of global economic, cultural, and
political trends in the post-Cold War era, it is often argued that the impact of
American political values, cultural attitudes, and models of legislation on the
10
practices of other nations has increased dramatically. As Michael Tonry and
Kathleen Hatlestad summarize this conventional wisdom (with which they
11
disagree), “reformers in other countries are following a decade or more later
in the American footsteps to the same destination and are at various stages
along the way. Just as it was once often said that California’s present was
12
America’s future, America’s today could be other countries’ tomorrow.”
Indeed, to examine whether the novel American models of determinate
sentencing legislation are likely to spread globally it is not sufficient to
demonstrate that they have not yet been widely adopted by other legal systems.
After all, their global diffusion may only be a matter of time. Therefore, a
comparative analysis of this question must be grounded in an understanding of
the structural political and institutional features that have brought American
and European policymakers to proceed along contradictory paths while
designing their sentencing policy over the last decades. This article pursues this
goal by examining two interlocking questions. First, what structural features of
American law and American politics have stimulated the recent proliferation of
determinate sentencing reform in the United States? Second, to what extent do
the structural conditions shaping the contours of sentencing policy in
contemporary European states enable and constrain the transplantations of

8. See GUSTAVE DE BEAUMONT & ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, THE AMERICAN PENITENTIARY
AND ITS APPLICATION IN FRANCE (1979).
9. Arie Frieberg, Three Strikes and You’re Out—It’s Not Cricket: Colonization and Resistance in
Australian Sentencing, in SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES 29, 31 (Michael
Tonry & Richard Frase eds., 2001).
10. See, e.g., Ugo Mattei, A Theory of Imperial Law: A Study of U.S. Hegemony and Latin
Resistance, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 383 (2003); Wolfgang Wiegand, The Reception of
American Law in Europe, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 229 (1991).
11. Indeed, Michael Tonry’s comparative works offer some of the most important rebuttals of the
tendency to generalize from the American experience on the future direction of other countries. See,
e.g., Michael Tonry, Determinants of Penal Policies, 36 CRIME & JUST. 1 (2007).
12. MICHAEL TONRY & KATHLEEN HATLESTAD, SENTENCING REFORM IN OVERCROWDED
TIMES: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 3 (1997).
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13

these American models of reform? A cluster of outstanding comparative
works published over the last decade have helped us to develop a more
profound understanding of the political, cultural, and institutional determinants
that have shaped the contradictory trajectories of American and European
14
approaches to criminal justice policy in the late-modern era. This article draws
on and seeks to contribute to this literature by illuminating the distinctive role
played by sentencing reform within the larger terrain of criminal justice
policymaking.
Part II of this article depicts the current differences between the United
States and other central common law and civil law systems with regard to the
forms, extent, and effects of determinate sentencing regimes. Part III discusses
the political underpinnings of these differences. By analyzing the ideological
and institutional conditions that shape sentencing policymaking processes in the
United States, continental Europe, and England and Wales, the article explains
the factors that have enabled and constrained the spread of determinate
sentencing laws in different national settings. Part IV considers the influence of
the institutional design of judicial and prosecutorial processes in the United
States and Europe on the way in which sentencing discretion is being regulated,
and on the ability of different legislative models of structuring sentencing
discretion to achieve their intended aims. Part V summarizes the article’s main
arguments, and situates them within the wider context of the transformation of
constitutional orders in contemporary democracies.
II
LAWS REGULATING SENTENCING DISCRETION:
THE UNITED STATES AS AN OUTLIER
The mid-1970s signaled a notable shift in dominant ideas about the purposes
and procedures of criminal sentencing in the United States. Over most of the
preceding century, the sentencing structures of individual states and of the

13. There might be a disagreement on how to position recent trends in English sentencing policy
within the context of the widening divide between the United States and continental Europe. In my
view, it is more accurate to describe the current American approach to the regulation of sentencing
discretion as an outlier to the policy principles of other Western nations (which, in the European
context, includes both the United Kingdom and continental nation-states) rather than as a variant of a
broader common law approach. This view will be defended in part II by demonstrating that common
law systems refused to adopt the American models of determinate sentencing legislation, a refusal
grounded in a profound criticism of the assumptions and principles underlying these reforms. The
following parts will shed light on the reasons for this reaction, highlighting some major structural
differences in how sentencing policy is designed and implemented in the United States and in other
common law systems.
14. See, e.g., NICOLA LACEY, THE PRISONERS’ DILEMMA: POLITICAL ECONOMY AND
PUNISHMENT IN CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES (2008); JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE:
CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003);
Máximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea Bargaining
and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (2004); TONRY, supra
note 12.
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federal system were premised on the model of indeterminate sentencing, in
which judges and parole boards were authorized to set the offender’s penalty
within a broad range of statutory options. In an era in which the social
reintegration of offenders was perceived as the primary aim of the penal system,
professional trust in the ability of judicial and parole authorities to tailor each
offender’s penalty to his individual prospects of desisting from crime led to the
proliferation of indeterminate sentencing regimes. The dominance of
indeterminate sentencing came under fierce criticism in the 1970s as part of a
15
broader crisis of the ideology of penal welfarism. Criminological literature of
the period raised new concerns regarding the achievability of the rehabilitative
16
aims of the penal system. Normative writers questioned the compatibility of
the indeterminate sentencing approach with basic notions of proportionality
and equality in light of its failure to address the potential for arbitrary or
17
discriminatory exercise of discretion by individual judges. In the political
debate, liberal critics argued that indeterminate sentencing was prone to
reinforce racial disparities in the administration of criminal justice in light of its
18
failure to control racial biases, while conservative commentators stressed its
19
failure to prevent undue leniency in sentencing.
The convergence of these various strands of political and criminological
critique created increasing pressures to transform the principles and procedures
of American sentencing. The final decades of the twentieth century were
marked by the emergence of new legislative trends which sought to increase the
determinacy and severity of criminal sentences. Among these legislative trends,
three have been particularly influential: (1) the growing use of mandatory
penalties, (2) the introduction of numerical sentencing guidelines, and (3) the
imposition of statutory restrictions on prisoners’ eligibility for parole (under the
banner of “truth-in-sentencing” laws). I now move to introduce these three
legislative trends, and to consider the extent to which they have had an impact
on sentencing policy outside the United States. As will be shown, continental
systems and other common law systems have rejected these three major models
of American sentencing reform. The determinants shaping the widening divide
between the sentencing structures of the United States and those of other
Western democracies will be analyzed in the following sections.

15. DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL 8 (2001).
16. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL CONFINEMENT
AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME 61 (1995).
17. See, e.g., MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1972);
ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976).
18. See, e.g., AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT ON CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1971).
19. See, e.g., JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME (1975).
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A. Mandatory Penalties in the United States and in Europe
The first vehicle of determinate sentencing reform in American law has
been the enactment of mandatory penalties. Until the mid-1970s, criminal codes
in the United States included very few mandatory sentences. The existing
provisions applied to a narrow class of offenses, such as murder, drunk driving,
20
and drug trafficking. Furthermore, the post-WWII decades have seen a
constant decline in the number of mandatory penalties. This trend culminated
with the repeal of nearly all federal mandatory penalties for drug offenses by
the U.S. Congress in 1970 following a series of critical reports that questioned
21
the utility of such measures. As a result, the change of course taken by
American legislatures since the early 1980s was dramatic. With the increasing
politicization and more punitive tone of criminal justice policy in the 1980s, the
idea of determinate sentencing enjoyed a notable renaissance. State and
national legislatures began to introduce mandatory penalty laws to tackle an
ever wider ambit of criminal offenses, including drug possession and aggravated
22
forms of various felonies. In Florida, for example, the state legislature enacted
seven new mandatory sentencing bills between 1988 and 1990 alone; the U.S.
Congress enacted at least twenty new mandatory penalty provisions between
23
1985 and 1991.
The massive expansion of mandatory penalties gained further momentum in
the 1990s. Mandatory sentences began to be increasingly used to address the
problem of repeat offending. Earlier provisions of mandatory sentencing laws
sought to address the aggravated harmfulness or moral wrongfulness of
particular criminal conducts. In the 1990s, however, such legislation began to
target the problem of recidivism per se, while setting a much lower threshold
with regard to the severity of the offenses liable to such penalties. The most
salient example of this trend has been the proliferation of “Three Strikes and
You’re Out” laws. Typically providing for an enhanced penalty on the second
conviction and for a lengthy imprisonment on the third conviction (for example,
in California, twenty-five years to life), no less than twenty-four states had
24
enacted “Three Strikes” laws between 1993 and 1995. Congress supported the
proliferation of this legislation not only by enacting a federal statute subjecting
25
the perpetration of a third federal felony to life imprisonment; it also created a
26
range of fiscal incentives for the states to enact such laws. As a result of the
inflation of mandatory sentencing laws for repeat offenders, the ability of
20. MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 142 (1996).
21. Id.
22. Kevin R. Reitz, The Disassembly and Reassembly of U.S. Sentencing Practices, in SENTENCING
AND SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES 222, 229 (Michael Tonry & Richard S. Frase eds., 2001).
23. TONRY, supra note 20, at 146.
24. JOHN CLARK, JAMES AUSTIN & D. ALAN HENRY, THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT: A
REVIEW OF STATE LEGISLATION 1 (1997).
25. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c) (2006).
26. KATHERINE BECKETT & THEODORE SASSON, THE POLITICS OF INJUSTICE: CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 59 (2d ed. 2004).
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American judges to impose non-custodial sanctions on convicted offenders has
been significantly constrained. To use one salient example of this trend, in the
state of Arizona in the fiscal year 1990, the expansiveness of mandatory
sentencing laws made no less than fifty-seven percent of all felony offenders
27
subject to mandatory sentence enhancement.
The United States has not been alone in expanding the use of mandatory
sentences over the last decades. However, the extent of mandatory sentencing
legislation is much narrower in other legal systems. Such legislation usually
applies to a narrow class of severe offenses such as drug trafficking, human
trafficking, organized crime, terrorism, and sexual abuse of minors rather than
28
to recidivist patterns of milder offenses. Determinate sentencing laws outside
the United States are usually formulated in a more flexible fashion, typically
leaving judges with discretion to consider mitigating factors to avoid unduly
29
harsh sentences. America’s status as an outlier with regard to the use of
mandatory penalties can be most clearly understood when these laws are placed
within the broader context of recent shifts in the philosophy of sentencing
policy. As Anthony Bottoms has observed, in continental Europe, as well as in
the United Kingdom and Australia, the introduction in recent decades of
mandatory sentences for the most severe offenses has coincided with a
counteracting trend of the decreasing use of imprisonment for penalizing less30
serious crime. This strategy of severity bifurcation allows governments to
respond to public pressures to act against the most widely censured types of
crime while avoiding excessive increases in their prison population. By contrast,
in the United States, the proliferation of mandatory penalties has been a part
and parcel of a broader shift towards a “zero tolerance” approach, which
31
applies not only to severe crimes, but also to low-level offenses.
The differences between the European strategy of severity bifurcation and
the American strategy of “zero tolerance” can hardly be overstated. In
European sentencing law, new legal doctrines and institutional mechanisms
were created over the last four decades to reduce the use of custodial
32
penalties. In Germany, the “day fine” system—which allows judges to
commute time servable into fines, tailored both to the defendant’s earning
power and to his degree of culpability—has expanded dramatically from the
33
late 1960s to the present. By the mid-1990s, day fines were used to penalize
about 25% of offenders sentenced for “aggravated theft” (including burglary),
27.
28.
29.
30.

TONRY, supra note 20, at 146.
WHITMAN, supra note 14, at 71.
See, e.g., ANDREW ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 226 (5th ed. 2010).
Anthony Bottoms, The Philosophy and Politics of Sentencing, in THE POLITICS OF
SENTENCING REFORM 17, 40 (Chris Clarkson & Rod Morgan eds., 1996).
31. JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 101 (2007).
32. SONJA SNACKEN & DIRK VAN ZYL SMITH, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN PRISON LAW AND
POLICY 86–98 (2009).
33. Cornelius Nestler, Sentencing in Germany, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 109, 120 (2004).
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50% of all drug offenders, and 85% of offenders charged with simple theft or
34
assault. These figures stand in sharp contrast with the penalties for comparable
offenses in the United States. For instance, as of 1994, seventy-five percent of
35
burglars were sentenced to either prison or jail in American state courts. The
War on Drugs, with its heavy use of determinate sentencing provisions for
possession offenses, has extensively targeted drug users (rather than drug
dealers), a class of offenders that in Europe is treated mostly through a
36
combination of non-custodial sanctions and therapeutic measures. Various
other examples can be drawn from increased American reliance on
37
incarceration to enforce low-level, “quality of life” crimes. Ultimately, these
differences in sentencing strategies are pronounced in the marked gaps between
the average imprisonment periods across the Atlantic. In 1996, the average time
served in American state prisons was twenty-eight months, whereas in France it
38
was eight months.
The differences between the American and European approaches to
mandatory sentencing laws are pronounced not only in the extent of such
legislation and in the sentencing philosophy underpinning its enactment. They
are also likely to characterize the societal and institutional effects that these
laws generate. Máximo Langer has demonstrated that, even in policy areas in
which the impact of Americanization is noticeable with regard to the formal
adoption of new policies, European policies are unlikely to resemble their
American counterparts because they operate within an institutional culture
39
shaped by inquisitorial rules and values. Accordingly, even in those foreign
jurisdictions in which American models of mandatory penalties were or will be
formally adopted, such reforms will not easily facilitate substantive policy
convergence at the level of “law in action” as long as deep-seated differences of
professional values and institutional practices shall continue to prevail.
In the United States, it has been repeatedly shown that mandatory penalty
laws did not eliminate the role of discretion in shaping sentencing outcomes.
Instead, they shifted the control over the outcomes of the sentencing process
40
from the judges to the prosecutors. In a system in which ninety-five percent of
41
criminal trials are concluded by a guilty plea, one of the major effects of
determinate sentencing laws is in how they affect the dynamics of charge

34. Hans-Jörg Albrecht, Post-Adjudication Dispositions in Comparative Perspective, in
SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES 293, 310 (Michael Tonry & Richard S. Frase
eds., 2001).
35. WHITMAN, supra note 14, at 72.
36. MARKUS D. DUBBER, VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME 6 (2002).
37. Reitz, supra note 22, at 241–44.
38. WHITMAN, supra note 14, at 70.
39. See Langer, supra note 14.
40. Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors and the Exercise of Discretion, 117
YALE L.J. 1240 (2008).
41. Oren Gazal-Ayal & Limor Riza, Plea-Bargaining and Prosecution, in CRIMINAL LAW AND
ECONOMICS 145, 148 (Nuno Garoupa ed., 2009).
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bargaining and fact bargaining between prosecutors and defense attorneys. In
this respect, it is clear that the spread of mandatory sentences has substantially
increased the leverage of prosecutors in plea-bargaining negotiations, as these
negotiations are now conducted in the shadow of more predictable and more
severe penalties. Moreover, determinate sentencing laws have weakened the
ability of judges to mitigate the consequences to the defendant of prosecutorial
decisions that seem to be suspicious of discriminatory or arbitrary exercises of
discretion. However, when transplanted in the different institutional settings
that prevail in European legal systems, mandatory penalties will not necessarily
produce similar effects. Although many continental systems have recently
moved in the direction of allowing the prosecutor and the defendant to reach an
agreement over the charges (and, in some jurisdictions, over the sentence to
which they will appeal), judges in continental systems are much less constrained
by such agreements, and they continue to have independent responsibility to
42
determine the defendant’s guilt as well as his sentence. Even in England and
Wales, where defendants can bargain with prosecutors over the charges but not
over the penalties, the impact of mandatory penalties on the dynamics of plea
bargaining also seems less consequential than in the United States. In part IV of
this article, I will analyze the institutional determinants that shape the patterns
of divergence and convergence with respect to the effects of mandatory penalty
laws in different jurisdictions.
B. Sentencing Guidelines in the United States and in Europe
A second prolific avenue of determinate sentencing reform in post-1980
American law has been the introduction of numerical sentencing guidelines.
The idea of introducing formal guidelines into the American sentencing system
was first advocated by liberal commentators in the early 1970s as a means of
reinforcing values of legality, uniformity, and transparency in sentencing. In an
oft-cited statement of this liberal vision, federal judge Marvin Frankel criticized
43
“the unbridled power of the sentencers to be arbitrary and discriminatory.” He
argued that the creation of sentencing commissions and guidelines was
44
necessary to eliminate the “unruliness” then pervading American sentencing.
Before long, the idea of sentencing guidelines began to be supported by
conservative critics of the criminal justice system, who advocated their adoption
as a means to prevent the imposition of lenient sentences by liberal, “soft on
45
crime” judges. Thus, the system that emerged out of these converging concerns
of liberal and conservative circles has given emphasis not only to the values of
uniformity and transparency, but also to perceived urgency of “getting tough”
on crime.

42.
43.
44.
45.

See Langer, supra note 14.
FRANKEL, supra note 17, at 49.
Id.
GARLAND, supra note 15, at 59.
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The predominant way of formulating the sentencing guidelines in the
United States is based on a two-dimensional grid, with the seriousness of the
46
offense on one axis and the criminal history score on the other axis. Based on
the intersection of these two parameters, the guidelines provide a presumptive
sentencing range, within which the judge is expected to reach her final decision.
Sentencing guidelines in the United States typically require judges to provide
“substantial and compelling reasons” to justify a departure from the
47
presumptive sentencing range. The standard of appellate review over these
sentencing decisions varies from state to state. However, even in jurisdictions in
which a more deferential standard is taken by appellate courts, American
judges are more constrained than their peers in other common law systems with
regard to their authority to consider case-specific circumstances as mitigating
48
factors. Alongside the mechanisms of appellate review, some states (such as
Pennsylvania and Washington) publicize statistical data regarding the departure
49
rates of individual judges. In a system in which most of the judges are elected
to office by public vote, the publication of such data serves as another tool to
incentivize judicial compliance with the guidelines.
It is important not to lose sight of the different variants of sentencing
guidelines systems that operate today in the United States. In some states,
particularly those in which commissions were authorized to consider prison
capacity when establishing presumptive sentence ranges, sentencing guidelines
have had a moderating effect on the pro-growth tendencies of the prison
population; in other states, the guidelines reinforced populist law-and-order
50
crusades. Still, the American experience with sentencing guidelines clearly
51
continues to be regarded as unappealing by other nations. To date, the idea of
numerical guidelines has failed to find a market outside American borders. No
continental system has adopted sentencing guidelines. Among common law
systems, New Zealand is the only country that has introduced a system of
numerical guidelines (itself structured in a more flexible fashion than the typical
52
American model). As Julian Roberts has shown in his contribution to this
issue, the new system of sentencing guidelines introduced in England and Wales
in 2009 vests English judges with a considerably higher degree of discretion

46. Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and Unresolved Policy
Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190, 1201 (2005).
47. Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Guidelines Systems and Sentence Appeals: A Comparison of Federal
and State Experience, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 1482 (1997).
48. Julian V. Roberts, Sentencing Guidelines in England and Wales: Recent Developments and
Emerging Issues, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2013 at 1.
49. Frase, supra note 46, at 1199.
50. See Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in the States: Lessons for State and Federal Reform,
6 FED. SENTENCING REP. 123 (1993).
51. Michael Tonry, Parochialism in U.S. Sentencing Policy, 45 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 48, 60
(1999).
52. See Warren Young & Andrea King, Sentencing Practice and Guidance in New Zealand, 22
FED. SENTENCING REP. 254 (2010).
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53

than is provided under the American models. In addition to England and
Wales, public committees that considered whether to introduce and how to
design new systems of sentencing guidelines in Canada, Western Australia, and
Israel have all rejected the American model of numerical guidelines. Judges,
scholars, and policymakers who participated in these public debates have widely
criticized the failure of presumptive numerical guidelines to allow judges to
recognize the factual variations between different cases and to adjust the
54
punishment to the specific circumstances of the offender and the offense. The
fact that the evidence on the negative consequences of numerical guidelines was
more consequential in shaping the policy outcomes outside the United States is
telling. As I will argue below, the resistance to the American model in
continental and commonwealth legal systems is not only a product of
ideological disagreement. It is also a result of the different degrees to which
evidence-based arguments have an impact on the policy choices that are
eventually made. In continental Europe in particular, the policymaking process
is more insulated from popular pressures and provides scholars and
administrative elites with much greater influence over the design and
institutionalization of policy reforms. This difference has provided judges and
other professional groups outside the United States with more effective tools to
resist reform initiatives that strengthen the legislative control over the
sentencing process.
Outside the United States, two alternative models have emerged over the
last decades to promote similar purposes to those pursued by the American
guidelines movement. The first model is based on the development of clearer
statutory statements of the principles of sentencing and of their proper
application in individual cases. Since the late 1980s, Sweden has operated a
system of principle–guidelines, clarifying the primacy given to considerations
related to the offender’s culpability over utilitarian aims and providing judges
with parameters to determine the “penal value” of the criminal conduct in
55
individual cases. Different versions of this model subsequently developed in
other Scandinavian countries over the next two decades. Interestingly enough,
the Scandinavian model of principle–guidelines also grew out of an increasing
56
criticism of the rehabilitative ideal, and a rising consensus that retributive
principles (as refined under contemporary theories of just desert) provide a
57
more solid foundation to the legitimization of state punishment. The fact that

53. Roberts, supra note 48, at 5
54. For examples from England and Wales, see ASHWORTH, supra note 29, at 418; for examples
from Australia, see Freiberg, supra note 9, at 29.
55. Andrew Von Hirsch, Numerical Grids or Guiding Principles?, in THE SENTENCING
COMMISSION AND ITS GUIDELINES 47 (Andrew Von Hirsch, Michael Tonry & Kay A. Knapp eds.,
1987).
56. Tapio Lappi-Seppälä, Sentencing and Punishment in Finland: The Decline of the Repressive
Ideal, in SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES 92, 107 (Michael Tonry & Richard S.
Frase eds., 2001).
57. John Pratt, Scandinavian Exceptionalism in an Era of Penal Excess, Part I: The Nature and
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the Scandinavian reaction against rehabilitation took a radically different
trajectory than the American counterpart is intriguing. As Andrew Von Hirsch
notes, compared with the American model of numeric sentencing guidelines,
the Scandinavian model vests much greater responsibility in the hands of
appellate courts. Whereas in a numerical system of sentencing guidelines
appellate courts are mainly required to monitor compliance with the tariffs
specified in the grid, in the Swedish model courts actively construct the penal
standards by interpreting and applying these principles throughout the
58
development of their case law.
In other common law systems, the effort to develop more consistent and
coherent sentencing standards has led to the development of “guideline
judgments” by courts of appeal. The Court of Appeal Criminal Division in
59
England and Wales has been issuing such guidelines since the 1970s. Appellate
courts in Western Australia and New South Wales adopted this practice in the
60
1990s. Guidelines judgment usually seek to clarify the main aggravating and
mitigating factors with respect to particular offenses and in some cases suggest
61
appropriate starting points or a range of sentences. Judges are expected to
62
consider these judgments while tailoring the sentence to the facts of the case.
However, both in England and in Australia, the guidelines judgments are not
considered to be formally binding, and appellate courts have emphasized the
need to apply them in light of the general principles of discretionary sentencing
63
inherent in the tradition of English sentencing.
C. Laws Restricting the Possibility of Early Release in and Outside the United
States
One of the issues that attracted the fiercest criticism by proponents of
determinate sentencing reform in the United States was the discrepancy
between the length of prison term imposed on convicted offenders by the courts
and the actual time they eventually served. This discrepancy was a product of
the extensive use of early release mechanisms in the system of indeterminate
sentencing. In a political setting that defined the rehabilitation and social
reintegration of offenders as central tasks of penal institutions, early release
mechanisms such as parole and “time for good behavior” were perceived as
important devices to tailor the actual prison term of every individual offender
64
to his prospects of desisting from crime. The increasing use of early release
Roots of Scandinavian Exceptionalism, 48 BRIT. J. CRIM. 119, 133 (2008).
58. Von Hirsch, supra note 55, at 57–58.
59. Andrew Ashworth, The Decline of English Sentencing and Other Stories, in SENTENCING AND
SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES 62, 73 (Michael Tonry & Richard Frase eds., 2001).
60. Freiberg, supra note 9, at 36–37.
61. ASHWORTH, supra note 29, at 36.
62. See e.g., R v. Johnson, 15 Cr. App. R. 827, 830 (1994).
63. ASHWORTH, supra note 29, at 36–37.
64. JONATHAN SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE: PAROLE AND THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF THE
UNDERCLASS, 1890–1990 123 (1993).
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mechanisms across Europe and in the United States was part and parcel of the
growing bureaucratic capacities and public legitimacy of welfare states, a
historical process that culminated in the post-WWII era. Because the legitimacy
of these early release practices depended on the credibility of the penal system’s
stated capacities to rehabilitate offenders (and, at a deeper level, hinged on the
degree of public trust in the capacity of the state to reduce crime levels through
welfarist forms of supervision and intervention), these practices came under
increasing criticism as part of the broader legitimation crisis of the modern
welfare state. Indeed, in the 1970s, the extensive use of early release
mechanisms in times of mounting crime rates came to be seen as a telling
symptom of the chronic failure of the welfare state to deliver its “social
65
engineering” aspirations.
With the radicalization of law-and-order politics in the 1980s, statutory
reforms restricting offenders’ eligibility for early release became popular among
American legislatures. Early legislation in this field focused on establishing
parole guidelines in an attempt to structure the discretion of parole boards in
66
setting release dates. Later on, legislatures in various states began to abolish
parole altogether or to substantially restrict its scope. By the late 1990s,
fourteen states and the federal system had abolished early release based on the
discretion of the parole board for all offenders, while several others abolished
67
parole release for certain felony offenders. Most of the states that did not
abolish their parole system introduced new laws requiring offenders to serve a
substantial portion of their prison sentence. These laws, which proliferated
under the banner of “truth in sentencing” legislation, became widespread
throughout the 1990s. To date, at least twenty-seven states require certain types
of offenders to serve eighty-five percent of their prison sentences before
68
obtaining eligibility for early release. The federal government played a key
role in prodding the spread of these laws. The Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994 authorized the federal government to provide
incentive grants to states which denied prisoners’ eligibility to early parole
69
before completing eighty-five percent of their sentence. In the following year,
70
not less than eleven states adopted such legislation.
During the same period, no other legal system outside the United States
abolished its system of early release. In several countries, legislatures required
courts to take further considerations while exercising their discretion in early
release decisions. For example, in Germany, the Penal Code was amended in

65. GARLAND, supra note 15, at 65–68.
66. Keith A. Bottomley, Parole in Transition: A Comparative Study of Origins, Developments and
Prospects for the 1990s, in 12 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 319 (Michael Tonry &
Norval Morris eds., 1990).
67. PAULA M. DITTON & DORIS J. WILSON, TRUTH IN SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS 3 (1999).
68. Id.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 13704(a) (2006).
70. Id.
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1998 to require judges to consider “the safety interests of the public” when
71
determining the prisoner’s eligibility for early release. Another recent reform
in German law requires the courts to consult an expert witness to assess the
offender’s continued dangerousness in cases in which his offense had caused
72
bodily harm. These amendments change the normative framework within
which European judges reach sentencing decisions. However, by steering clear
of introducing specific numerical prescriptions regarding the minimum time
prisoners must serve before obtaining eligibility for early release, they retain
the discretionary framework that recent American legislation in this field has
sought to curtail.
In France and many other European countries, judicial discretion with
regard to the offender’s eligibility for early release has not been substantially
73
constrained by legislation. True, there is evidence that the actual rates of
conditional release have declined over the last two decades and it is possible to
attribute this trend to the rise of a more punitive public attitude. However, a
plausible alternative explanation would link this development to recent changes
in the composition of the prison population in light of the decreasing use of
imprisonment to penalize low-level offenses. As the prison population becomes
dominated by offenders convicted for serious offenses (as opposed to the
74
current situation in the United States), the rates of prisoners found eligible for
early release is likely to decrease. In this respect, the declining rates of early
release in European countries are rooted in institutional and political changes
that are quite contradictory to those fuelling the legislative restrictions on
eligibility for parole in America.
In a trend that even more pronouncedly diverges from the American
experience, some European systems have introduced mechanisms of mandatory
early release over the last two decades. In 1998, Sweden instituted a system of
nearly universal mandatory release in which all inmates sentenced to an
imprisonment period of more than one month must be given conditional release
75
once they have served two thirds of their sentence. English parole policy,
following a reform that came into force in 1992, combines mandatory regimes of
early release for short sentences (less than four years) and discretionary regimes
76
for long sentences (four years and more). This policy is integrated into the
broader strategy of severity bifurcation that seeks to relieve fiscal pressures on

71. See Thomas Weigend, Sentencing and Punishment in Germany, in SENTENCING AND
SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES 188, 211–12 (Michael Tonry & Richard Frase eds., 2001).
72. Id. at 211.
73. See Pierre V. Tournier, Systems of Conditional Release in the Member States of the Council of
Europe, 1 CHAMP PÉNAL (2004).
74. See supra Part II.A.
75. Tournier, supra note 73.
76. Stephen Shute, The Development of Parole and the Role of Research in its Reform, in THE
CRIMINOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PENAL POLICY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ROGER HOOD 377
(Lucia Zedner & Andrew Ashworth eds., 2003).
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the correctional system through “decarcerating” the treatment of low-level
offenses.
III
THE STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND THE
REGULATION OF SENTENCING DISCRETION
Why, then, has the American approach to the regulation of sentencing
discretion become an outlier to international standards? Why has it come to
rely on more formalized statutory schemes for structuring the exercise of
discretion and to establish penal standards that are much harsher than those
prevailing in other Western legal systems? In this section, I argue that some of
the major factors shaping American exceptionalism in this field are found in the
extensive degree to which sentencing policymaking is attached to ordinary
politics in the United States. A set of interlocking constitutional and political
arrangements that distinguish the United States from other Western
democracies makes American criminal justice policymakers more vulnerable to
electoral pressures to adopt populist responses to crime. The discussion that
follows examines how these constitutional and political arrangements have
facilitated the mobilization of popular demand and political support of the
entrenchment of determinate sentencing reforms in the United States, and why
the arrangements structuring sentencing policymaking in European
democracies do not provide political openings to the mobilization of such
reforms.
As Carol Steiker points out,
In the United States . . . in comparison to the rest of the industrialized West . . . crime
has a political salience that is extraordinarily high, almost impossible to overstate. As a
result, themes of “law and order” tend to dominate electoral battles at all levels of
governments, and the designation “soft on crime” tends to be a political liability of
enormous and
generally untenable consequence for political actors at all levels of
77
government.

Along with the increasing politicization of criminal justice policy over the
last several decades, the traditional left–right ideological conflicts over the
required responses to crime problems have weakened, as the policy frames of
both major parties came to converge around a shared set of ultra-punitive
78
assumptions and solutions. These interlocking changes in the political salience
and ideological orientation of criminal justice policy help to explain both the
explosion of statutory sentencing reforms since the 1970s, and the more populist
tone of that legislation. Indeed, many recent forms of determinate sentencing
legislation seem to emphasize sound-bite political slogans that can hardly be
squared with criminological knowledge on the actual impacts of such policies

77. Carol S. Steiker, Capital Punishment and American Exceptionalism, 81 OREG. L. REV. 97, 113
(2002).
78. WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 236–41 (2011).
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(for example, “Three Strikes and You’re Out,” “10–20–Life,” “Life Means
79
Life,” “Adult Time for Adult Crime,” and “Hard Time for Armed Crime”).
At the institutional level, one of the distinctive features of American
democracy that enables sound-bite political slogans to gain such an influence on
sentencing policy has been the widespread use of direct democracy tools
80
alongside the more established channels of parliamentary representation.
Among the different tools of direct democracy available in the contemporary
United States (including popular referendum, legislative referral, and recall
elections), the most consequential on the direction of criminal justice policy has
been the ballot initiative. In force today in twenty-four states, the ballot
initiative process provides a mechanism by which citizens, upon collection of a
specified number of voter signatures, may propose new statutory or
81
constitutional provisions for voter consideration. Proposals that win the
popular vote may be written into law without having to pass through the
ordinary channels of parliamentary legislation. The use of direct democracy
82
tools in American politics dates back to the 1890s. However, the number of
initiatives placed on statewide ballots as well as their impact on the
policymaking process has increased dramatically since the late 1970s. In the
1980s and 1990s, American citizens voted on 271 and 389 statewide initiatives,
respectively, compared with a comparable figure of less than 100 statewide
83
initiatives conducted throughout the 1960s. The growing prominence of
initiatives has considerably supported (and was itself facilitated by) the
expanding involvement of social movements in mobilizing sentencing reform.
Many of the more populist versions of determinate sentencing legislation were
enacted following successful ballot initiatives. The proliferation of the “Three
Strikes and You’re Out” legislation, a reform that redesigned state penal
practices in accordance with the logic of a famous baseball rule, provides a
84
telling example. The idea of subjecting recidivist offenders to life
imprisonment upon their third conviction was initiated by grassroots activists
85
and adopted by a citizen’s initiative in the state of Washington in 1993. Within
86
the next three years, twenty-four states had adopted such legislation. The
spread of this legislation exemplifies the spillover effect of ballot initiatives on

79. GARLAND, supra note 15, at 13.
80. See Caroline J. Tolbert & Daniel A. Smith, Representation and Direct Democracy in the United
States, 42 REPRESENTATION 25 (2006).
81. Larry J. Sabato, Bruce A. Larson & Howard R. Ernst, Introduction, in DANGEROUS
DEMOCRACY? THE BATTLE OVER BALLOT INITIATIVES IN AMERICA ix–x (Larry J. Sabato, Howard
R. Ernst & Bruce A. Larson eds., 2001).
82. Howard Ernst, The Historical Role of Narrow-Material Interests, in DANGEROUS
DEMOCRACY? THE BATTLE OVER BALLOT INITIATIVES IN AMERICA, supra note 81, at 1, 10.
83. Tolbert & Smith, supra note 80, at 26.
84. See, e.g., FRANKLIN ZIMRING, GORDON HAWKINS & SAM KAMIN, PUNISHMENT AND
DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA (2001).
85. VANESSA BARKER, THE POLITICS OF IMPRISONMENT 118 (2009).
86. CLARK ET AL., supra note 24, at 1.
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87

the rhetoric and policy choices of legislatures. By mobilizing grassroots
activists, media attention, and funding in support of particular policy frames,
the strategic use of initiatives by social movements often has a considerable
agenda-setting effect, providing legislatures both with stronger incentives and
with new opportunities to endorse populist policy reforms. In light of
foreseeable budgetary implications and the weak criminological evidence in
88
support of the rationale of “Three Strikes” laws, it is highly questionable
whether this policy model could have been originally passed into law by
reasonably-informed legislatures. The passage of these statutes via plebiscite
campaigns paved the way for a nationwide trend that would have faced much
stronger professionalized and administrative resistance in the legislative
89
processes of a pure representative democracy.
The structure of democratic politics in other national systems inhibits the
capability of grassroots social movements to exert direct influence on the
content of sentencing policy. In democracies such as Germany and England,
strong degrees of party discipline and majority support in the legislative house
90
provide governments with firmer control over the policy agenda. Governments
may—and often do—face pressure to introduce popular “tough on crime”
reforms, and they have electoral incentives to be responsive to such pressure.
However, they operate within a constitutional and cultural setting that poses
much stronger constraints on their capability to pursue electoral gains while
making policy choices, particularly when these popular reforms face opposition
91
from professional experts. Whereas the greater leverage of judicial elites and
professional experts in other systems enable them to ensure better-informed
and long-term-oriented processes of deliberation over the likely impacts of
proposed sentencing reforms, the American political system is less capable of
channeling policy proposals to nonpartisan forums.
Another catalyst to the politicized nature of sentencing policymaking in the
United States is associated with the procedures of selecting judges and
prosecutors. As opposed to other Western nations, most of the judges and
public prosecutors in the United States are either directly elected by the public
or are appointed by elected politicians. Over ninety-five percent of county and

87. Elisabeth R. Gerber, Legislative Responses to the Threat of Popular Initiatives, 40 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 99, 124 (1996).
88. Franklin E. Zimring, Populism, Democratic Government, and the Decline of Expert Authority:
Some Reflections on Three Strikes in California, 28 PAC. L. J. 243 (1996).
89. Recent trends in Swiss criminal justice policy provide further evidence of the linkage between
extensive use of direct democracy tools and the populist character of criminal justice policy. For
example, in 2010, Swiss voters approved a new constitutional provision requiring the automatic
expulsion of foreign nationals convicted of certain criminal offenses specified by law, including benefit
fraud. In 2004, an initiative requiring the lifelong detention of dangerous sexual and violent offenders
was approved. On the difficulties in reconciling the outcomes of recent initiatives in the field of criminal
justice with fundamental constitutional rights, see Daniel Moeckli, Of Minarets and Foreign Criminals:
Swiss Direct Democracy and Human Rights, 11 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 774 (2011).
90. LACEY, supra note 14, at 70.
91. ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 69 (2001).
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municipal prosecutors are selected by popular election. These selection
procedures create a strong pressure on judges and prosecutors to be responsive
to widespread popular resentment toward criminals. As Michael Tonry notes,
“many American prosecuting attorneys appear constantly to be campaigning
and often to formulate their general policies and their tactics in individual cases
on the bases of how they will be reported by journalists and how these reports
93
will be received by the general public on the evening news programs.” By
contrast, in continental Europe and in England and Wales, decisions related to
the appointment and tenure of judges are dominated by senior civil servants in
94
the judiciary. As will be argued later, the continental model of hierarchic
organization of the judiciary encourages the compliance of individual judges
with the policy goals espoused by judicial and professional elites. In the context
of the relationship between sentencing policy and electoral politics, we should
note the contribution of these arrangements to relieving the pressure on judges
to satisfy popular opinion in their rulings.
It may be argued that the politicized nature of judicial selection procedures
in the United States reinforces rather than damages the public legitimacy of
judges because it symbolizes some of the values most central to America’s
democratic ethos, particularly the values of popular participation and suspicion
of state authority. Nonetheless, these procedures of judicial selection make it
more difficult for judges to capitalize on the professional values of judicial
neutrality and objectivity while opposing political reforms curtailing their
discretionary powers. In a judicial system that involves so many visible elements
of politicization, judges are less able to convince the public that the
intensification of legislative intervention in sentencing matters would encroach
on their professional prerogatives. As Michael Tonry has noted, “judges
everywhere oppose efforts to limit their sentencing discretion but have been
much more successful outside the United States than in. . . . Civil service and
meritocratically selected judges may appear more professional, nonpartisan,
and authoritative than elected and politically appointed judges, who may
95
appear more political, partisan, and ordinary.”
The differences between American and European approaches concerning
the politicization of sentencing policy have deep historical and ideological roots.
In the United States, the mobilization of sentencing reform through citizens’
initiatives and referendums, the popular election of judges and prosecutors, and
the weak influence of bureaucratic elites and the academy on the character of
96
public policy are all rooted in a distinctive creed of American political culture.
American political culture is characterized by a strong preference to defer to
clear majority sentiments rather than to intellectually-inspired bureaucratic
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Steiker, supra note 77, at 119.
Tonry, supra note 51, pp. 61–63.
MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 151 (1986).
Tonry, supra note 51, at 61.
Steiker, supra note 77, at 116.

07_AHARONSON_BP (DO NOT DELETE)

No.1 2013]

3/19/2013 5:52 PM

DETERMINATE SENTENCING

179

97

elites. Determinate sentencing laws have gained popular support in the United
States because they epitomize this deep-seated creed of American political
culture. These laws were advocated as a means to reclaim the people’s role in
shaping the standards of penal sentencing, so as to better reflect widely held
views regarding the supremacy of crime-reductive goals over due process
principles. Proponents of these reforms presented the people’s right to actively
participate in determining criminal sentences (which in the colonial period was
institutionalized through vesting the jury with a sentencing function,
independent of its fact-finding role) as a form of democratic participation that
was gradually usurped by professional actors (judges and parole officers)
98
throughout the entrenchment of the indeterminate sentencing approach. In
this context, it is notable that the constitutional checks imposed on the
implementation of determinate sentencing laws by the Supreme Court focused
on strengthening the popular participation in the process by requiring that any
factor aggravating the defendant’s sentence under the sentencing guidelines
99
must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond reasonable doubt. By contrast,
the debate over the constitutionality of determinate sentencing laws in England,
for example, focused on their effect on the established principles of judicial
100
independence and separation of powers.
The American mode of balancing between public participation and
professional expertise is quite exceptional among modern Western
democracies. In continental European and British political cultures, there is
longstanding support of the view that professional experts and senior civil
servants should play a proactive role in mediating the expression of the popular
101
will throughout the policymaking process. In Europe, particularly in Germany
and other states that followed its expert-oriented model of codification, this
102
conception harks back to at least the late eighteenth century. Although the
codification project was legitimated as a means to ensure judicial compliance
with the popular will, in practice, the codes were formulated by an exclusive
103
group of elite jurists.
The emphasis given in American sentencing policy to ensure the
responsiveness of judges to the popular will may have some normative appeal.

97. Id.
98. Nancy Gertner, A Short History of American Sentencing: Too Little Law, Too Much Law, Or
Just Right, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691, 692 (2010).
99. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
100. Ashworth, supra note 59, at 62.
101. Joachim Savelsberg, Knowledge, Domination, and Criminal Punishment, 99 AM. J. SOC. 911
(1994).
102. Arguably, scholars in the continental tradition played a prominent role in formulating legal
codes already in the Roman period. The important parts of Justinian’s Corpus Juris Civilis were
formulated by jurisconsults, recognized experts on the law who formally had neither legislative nor
judicial function. See JOHN H. MARRYMAN & REGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW
TRADITION 57 (3d ed. 2007).
103. Id. at 31.
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However, this emphasis makes the American sentencing system vulnerable to a
cluster of problems associated with the adverse effects of unbridled
politicization on the legal process. Studies on the nature of public views
regarding sentencing policy reveal that, although public opinion polls often
reflect a widespread concern about judicial leniency toward criminals, these
popular views are often based on overestimations of actual crime rates and on
underestimations of the average severity of sentences (misjudgments that are
routinely constructed by the exaggerated and sensationalist style of
104
representations of crime in the mass media). When provided with more
accurate and specific information about the particular circumstances of the
offense in light of the legal framework, respondents are likely to support the
imposition of penalties that are generally in line with and often more lenient
105
than the average sentences imposed by professional judges.
Moreover, when we bear in mind that political and legal discourses never
simply mirror public opinion but also construct public views and sensibilities,
another explanation of the limited reception of determinate sentencing laws in
Europe comes to mind. The mechanisms used by European systems to insulate
sentencing policy from populist pressure not only set limits on the way in which
punitive sentiments may be expressed by the law. They also shape public
discourse about crime in a way that, in contrast to the American case, does not
cultivate the radicalization of popular punitive sentiments. Political debates
about criminal justice policy in Europe have exposed the public to much more
critical and realistic views on the limitations of imprisonment. When we
recognize that the relationship between public opinion and criminal justice
policymaking in a democracy is constituted by a cycle of mutual reinforcement,
in which politicians both respond to and simultaneously construct public
106
demand for particular forms of policy intervention to reduce crime levels, we
gain a better understanding of why, even in periods during which European
democracies such as Germany have experienced rising crime rates, public
opinion in these nations did not develop an appetite for determinate sentencing
107
reforms of the type exemplified by initiatives-driven American models. In
Europe, therefore, legislatures could accommodate popular demands to protect
the public from the risks of crime by introducing more severe mandatory
sentences for highly publicized heinous offenses. They did not, however,
experience similar electoral pressure to expand the scope of such legislation to
more ordinary crimes or to engage in symbolic displays of legislative control
over sentencing matters by imposing strict restrictions on the discretionary
powers of judges and early-release decision-makers.

104. Julian V. Roberts, American Attitudes about Punishment: Myth and Reality, in SENTENCING
REFORM IN OVERCROWDED TIMES 250 (Michael Tonry & Kathleen Hatlestad eds., 1997).
105. Id. at 253.
106. LACEY, supra note 14, at 71.
107. Nestler, supra note 33, 119–20.
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IV
THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE REGULATION OF
SENTENCING DISCRETION
When we address the problem of disparities in sentencing, it is important to
recall that sentencing outcomes are shaped by a series of decisions made
108
throughout all stages of the criminal process. These include not only judicial
rulings, but also a wide range of decisions made by police officers, prosecutors,
and juries—among others. To one degree or another, each of these decisions
involves the exercise of discretion. Thus, a comprehensive framework for
addressing the way in which the exercise of discretion generates unwarranted
disparities in sentencing cannot exclusively focus on the final stage in which the
judge chooses the penalty. It must address the various ways in which other legal
actors, whose decisions construct the factual and legal grounds on the basis of
which judges decide to impose particular sentences at the end of the process,
employ their discretionary powers.
Drawing on this basic premise, this part presents a twofold argument. First, I
argue that the more extensive reliance on statutory tools to structure sentencing
discretion is a product of the American system’s insufficient use of judicial
mechanisms by which the problem of sentencing disparities may be tackled. The
more hierarchical and bureaucratized structure of criminal justice institutions in
continental systems enables them to marshal a wider array of tools to govern
the way in which various officials, whose decisions have an impact on
sentencing outcomes, exercise discretion. Second, I suggest that even if the
introduction of determinate sentencing laws has enabled the American system
to better regulate an important aspect of the sentencing process—the aspect of
judicial decision-making—it has simultaneously loosened the regulation of
other aspects of the sentencing process. The introduction of these laws into a
system in which prosecutorial discretion is very lightly regulated, and in which
the vast majority of cases (nearly ninety-five percent) are concluded by guilty
pleas, has created institutional conditions in which sentencing disparities are
likely to grow in light of the shift of power from judges to prosecutors.
European judges operate within an institutional setting radically different
from that in which American judges perform their judicial functions. The
judiciary in continental Europe is organized in a highly centralized and
hierarchical structure. As noted earlier, in many American jurisdictions, judges
and prosecutors are elected by the public or are appointed by elected
politicians. By contrast, European judges and prosecutors are career civil
servants, whose tenure and promotion are predominantly dependent on
109
evaluation by superior colleagues. Judicial institutions in civil law systems
employ more extensive and comprehensive mechanisms of appellate review

108. See Paul H. Robinson & Barbara A. Spellman, Sentencing Decisions: Matching the
Decisionmaker to the Decision Nature, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1124 (2005).
109. LACEY, supra note 14, at 94.
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over the decisions of lower courts, as well as mechanisms of judicial oversight of
110
These features create a bureaucratic-styled
prosecutorial decisions.
organizational context in which judges are, on one hand, more insulated from
political pressure and, on the other hand, more dependent on judicial elites, and
thus face a stronger pressure to conform with the organizational norms of the
111
judiciary.
The greater degree of professional conformity in continental judiciaries
generates both desirable and undesirable effects, and analyzing all of them here
would be neither possible nor necessary. The important point for the purpose of
my argument is that because of the more hierarchical and bureaucratic structure
of the judiciary, and in light of the more proactive involvement of the judge in
reviewing prosecutorial decisions, continental systems are equipped with tighter
mechanisms to scrutinize various decisions that affect the defendant’s
112
sentence. The contrast with the United States is particularly pronounced with
respect to the regulation of prosecutorial power. In continental legal systems,
prosecutors’ charging decisions do not limit the jurisdiction of the court to
particular offenses and they have a much lighter impact on the judicial
113
determination of a sentence. The broad investigatory powers exercised by
continental judges in inquisitorial systems of criminal procedure provide them
with better tools than those available to their peers in adversarial systems to
scrutinize the extent to which prosecutorial discretion was exercised in
conformity with the regular standards in similar cases. In addition, the
professional ideology shaping the manner in which prosecutors in continental
systems perceive their role and duties also serves to standardize the way in
114
which they exercise their discretionary functions. By providing judges with
formal responsibility and with considerably fuller data to evaluate the
prosecutor’s decisions on whether to charge and for what offenses, continental
systems subject to scrutiny a much wider array of decisions that may cause
disparities in sentencing.
Compared with continental systems as well as with other common law
systems, trial judges in the United States possess much weaker tools to review
the charging and bargaining decisions of prosecutors. As the Supreme Court
expounded, “so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the
accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to
prosecute, and what charge to file . . . generally rests entirely in [the
115
prosecutor’s] discretion.”
This highly deferential approach—which is
110. MIRJAN DAMAŠKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A COMPARATIVE
APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS 48 (1986).
111. SHAPIRO, supra note 94, at 151.
112. KAGAN, supra note 91, at 79.
113. For instance, according to paragraph 249 of the German Strafgesetzbuch, the court may
determine that the conduct corresponds to crime definitions different from those suggested by the
prosecution.
114. DAMAŠKA, supra note 110, at 48.
115. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).
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rationalized by reference to separation of powers principles, as well as to
practical and normative limitations that the adversarial process poses on the
judge’s ability to evaluate the prosecutor’s charging decision in an informed and
legitimate manner—inhibits judicial involvement in reviewing allegations to
unconstitutional bias in prosecutorial decisions. De jure, selective prosecution
based on race is forbidden in the American system. In practice, no claim of
racially selective prosecution was accepted by the courts since the
117
Reconstruction era. The reluctance of American courts to address the impact
of prosecutorial charging decisions on the problem of racial disparities in
sentencing is based on the request that the claimant present “evidence that
similarly situated defendants of other races could have been prosecuted, but
118
were not.” This requirement is virtually impossible to fulfill in the absence of
available data on the evidence in light of which prosecutors decided to refrain
119
from charging in other cases.
In addition, the scope of issues examined in the appellate review process in
the American system is considerably narrower than is the norm both in
continental systems and in most other common law jurisdictions. As William
Pizzi points out, “issues such as whether a particular sentence is consistent with
the sentences received by similarly situated defendants . . . are not proper
considerations for appellate review as long as the sentence is within the lawful
120
sentencing range.” Appellate review was developed in the American system
much later than in other Western legal systems. Until the 1980s, only a minority
of states vested their appellate courts with the power to review sentences for
substantive propriety, and even in those states, courts were willing to intervene
121
only in extreme cases of clear abuse of judicial discretion. In contrast, in
continental systems, the defendant’s right to de novo consideration of his
122
sentence has become an inherent aspect of the criminal appeal much earlier.
This aspect of European sentencing law can be well understood as a product of
the structural characteristics of the inquisitorial culture of legal procedure.
Appellate judges in civil law systems have long been provided with a fuller
informative basis to review the decisions of lower courts (including a formal

116. See, e.g., Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 379–83 (2d Cir. 1973).
117. Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation vs. Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
101, 112 (2009). For discussions of the need to strengthen judicial oversight of prosecutorial discretion
so as to promote equality and prevent discrimination and arbitrariness, see Anne Bowen Poulin,
Prosecutorial Discretion and Selective Prosecution: Enforcing Protection After the United States v.
Armstrong, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1071 (1996); Donald G. Gifford, Equal Protection and the
Prosecutor’s Charging Decision: Enforcing an Ideal, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 659 (1981).
118. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 469 (1996).
119. Bibas, supra note 117, at 112.
120. William Pizzi, A Comparative Perspective on the Sentencing Chaos in the U.S, 6 GLOBAL
JURIST TOPICS, no. 1, 2006 at 27–28.
121. Reitz, supra note 47, at 1444.
122. Richard S. Frase, Sentencing and Comparative Law Theory, in CRIME, PROCEDURE AND
EVIDENCE IN A COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MIRJAN
DAMASKA 351, 354–55 (John Jackson, Maximo Langer & Peter Tillers eds., 2008).

07_AHARONSON_BP (DO NOT DELETE)

184

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

3/19/2013 5:52 PM

[Vol. 76:161

requirement upon judges to provide written reasons for their sentencing
decision—a requirement that did not have a parallel in the United States in the
123
pre-guidelines era). In England and Wales, the defendant’s right to appeal his
sentence has been recognized since the enactment of the Criminal Appeal Act
124
1907. The corpus of case law developed by the Court of Criminal Appeal over
the last century has served as a major tool to establish standards of uniformity
and coherence in English sentencing.
This brief overview of some of the key differences between the institutional
contexts in which American and continental judges operate helps to clarify both
the conditions under which determinate sentencing legislation has proliferated
in the United States (but not in Europe) and the differences in how this
legislation is implemented within these very different institutional settings.
First, even under the assumption that American determinate sentencing laws
are successful in bringing judges to comply with the sentencing standards they
125
prescribe, it is clear that the American approach to the governance of
sentencing discretion is structured in a lopsided manner, with tight regulation of
judicial discretion and weak checks on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
The problem is not only that the exclusive focus on tightening the regulation of
judicial discretion is too narrow (covering only a tip of the very big iceberg of
“discretion in sentencing”) but also that the curtailment of the discretionary
powers of judges restricts their ability to mitigate the abuse of prosecutorial
discretion. Combined with the tendency of determinate sentencing laws to
126
increase prosecutorial leverage in plea bargaining, there is reason to suspect
that these laws have exacerbated the peril that the arbitrary, discriminatory, or
simply unsystematic use of discretion by prosecutors will cause sentencing
disparities.
The tendency of determinate sentencing laws to shift power from judges to
prosecutors is likely to be less pronounced in continental systems than it has
been in the United States. Although many European systems have recently
adopted arrangements of “negotiated judgments” that have some similarities
with the adversarial model of plea bargaining, these arrangements retain a
much greater level of judicial scrutiny over prosecutorial decisions and only a
127
minority of criminal cases are settled by these methods. In addition, because
European systems have adopted only one form of determinate sentencing
legislation—mandatory penalties, applied to a narrow class of severe offenses—
prosecutors in continental systems are unlikely to gain similar degrees of
123. Id. at 355.
124. See Ashworth, supra note 59, at 73.
125. The accuracy of this assumption is far from certain. As Michael Tonry has shown, a sizeable
bulk of evidence demonstrates that judges, juries, and prosecutors employ a variety of adaptive
strategies to circumvent the imposition of mandatory sentences that they perceive as too harsh. See
TONRY, supra note 20, at 146–48.
126. Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancement in a World of Guilty Pleas,
110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1151–70.
127. Langer, supra note 14.
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influence over sentencing outcomes to those possessed by American
prosecutors. In the United States, the negative impact of determinate
sentencing laws in this context has been particularly conspicuous because of
their synergetic interactions with other institutional arrangements that also
work to empower prosecutors. For example, as emphasized by William Stuntz
in a series of seminal works, the breadth and depth of criminal codes in the
United States create a wealth of overlapping offense definitions and provides
128
prosecutors with useful bargaining chips to extract guilty pleas. When a
greater ambit of offenses is subjected to mandatory penalties, the impact of the
mutually reinforcing institutional deficiencies identified by Stuntz is
exacerbated, and prosecutors are provided with greater control over the
determination of sentencing outcomes.
Moreover, the ideological values that legitimize state punishment in
continental systems have posed additional barriers to the reception of
determinate sentencing laws in these systems. These values ground the
justifiability of state punishment on its being an outcome of a rigorous
inquisition of the relevant facts. The authority of the judge to determine the
penal sanction proportional to the perpetrator’s proven guilt is inherently
linked to the proactive role that he plays in earlier stages of the fact-finding
inquisition, as well as to his professional commitment to protect the defendant
against the excesses of state power throughout these earlier stages. Indeed, the
power of inquisitorial ideals in shaping the practices and professional
129
consciousness of European jurists is in decline. However, they probably still
pose some significant barriers to the reception of the more stringent versions of
determinate sentencing laws. “Truth in sentencing” laws, mandatory penalties,
and other schemes that prevent the judge from being able to individualize the
penalty pose a fundamental challenge to the way in which European jurists
define the values and legitimize the authority of their criminal justice systems.
In this regard, the failure of determinate sentencing laws to gain momentum
in continental Europe reflects a profound difference in how each of these
procedural systems seek to promote values of equality and to reduce sentencing
disparities. European systems seek to tackle disparities by vesting with the
judge broad powers to review the decisions of other legal officials and to
consider whether these decisions are consistent with the manner in which
similar cases have been administrated. The imposition of statutory constraints
on judicial discretion in sentencing is likely to damage the effectiveness of these
mechanisms of review. In the United States, by contrast, the egalitarian ideal of
treating like cases alike is pursued by means of establishing a standard of
uniformity with respect to entire classes of offenders. These uniform standards

128. William Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 506, 512–13
(2001).
129. Thomas Weigend, The Decay of the Inquisitorial Ideal, in CRIME, PROCEDURE AND
EVIDENCE IN A COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MIRJAN
DAMASKA, supra note 122, at 39.
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are increasingly dictated by the legislature, which is presented as ideally
positioned to guarantee the compatibility of sentencing rules with widespread
public views of the relative gravity of different offenses. The problem is that as
the mechanisms used to ensure judicial compliance with these generalized
prescriptions of required penalties take a more formalistic and binding
character, the ability of the legal system to deliver the other dimension of
Aristotle’s egalitarian ideal—treating unlike cases differently—is being
diminished.
V
CONCLUSION
The massive expansion of determinate sentencing legislation in
contemporary American law has been a part and parcel of the broader
restructuring of American law and politics following the demise of New Deal
liberalism. The liberal procedural reforms introduced by the American
Supreme Court in the post-WWII era symbolized the culmination of a decadeslong historical process by which the role of courts in shaping criminal justice
policy had grown significantly. This growth was a result both of the expansion
of judges’ discretionary powers throughout the entrenchment of the
indeterminate sentencing approach and of the constitutionalization of criminal
procedure. Reflecting the broader decline of public faith in the power of
government to solve the nation’s major social problems, the determinate
sentencing movement adapted the deep-seated American creed of “distrust of
government” to the modern reality of criminal justice governance, in which
130
courts play a highly visible role in shaping and implementing public policy.
Paradoxically, the liberal concerns regarding the excesses of judicial power
under the indeterminate sentencing approach initiated a reform movement that
both facilitated and legitimized the massive expansion of the state’s reliance on
its most repressive apparatuses—its carceral institutions.
The fact that determinate sentencing models of legislation were not widely
adopted outside the United States was explained in this article as a result of the
structural conditions shaping the processes of criminal lawmaking and the
institutional processes of reviewing sentencing decisions in both civil law and
common law systems. The combination of constitutional arrangements
insulating legislative processes from populist pressures with a robust ideological
commitment to the values of individualized sentencing poses structural
impediments to the ability of these formalized and harsh models of sentencing
legislation to pass through the legislative channels. This ideological
commitment is reinforced by the primacy attached to the values of dignity and
proportionality in contemporary European constitutionalism. The doctrinal
frameworks developed in European constitutional law to consider the
compatibility of sentencing practices with the values of human dignity and
130. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 6.
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proportionality offer a compelling alternative to the American jurisprudence of
sentencing and punishment, with its focus on considering whether the minimal
threshold of “cruel and unusual punishment” was violated and on the guarantee
131
of due process. The established mechanisms built into inquisitorial procedural
systems to review the decisions of trial courts and of prosecutors continue to
enjoy the trust both of professional actors and of the public at large in
European systems. In light of some troubling evidence provided by the recent
American experience, the resistance of European policymakers to adopt these
models of regulating sentencing discretion seems to be well grounded.

131. Markus Dubber, Toward a Constitutional Law of Crime and Punishment, 55 HASTINGS L. J.
509 (2004).

